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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The question of whether there is any value to the temporary storage of carbon is fundamental to climate policy design across a number of arenas, including physical carbon discounting in greenhouse gas accounting, the relative value of temporary carbon offsets, and the value of other carbon mitigation efforts that are known to be impermanent, including deferred deforestation. Quantifying the value of temporary carbon storage depends on a number of assumptions about how the incremental impact (or social cost) of a given ton of carbon emissions is expected to change over time. In 2009, a U.S. government interagency working group was established and assigned the responsibility of calculating social cost of carbon estimates to be used in benefi t/cost analysis of regulations impacting carbon dioxide emissions. Those estimates were released in March 2010. This working paper explores what those estimates imply about the value of temporary carbon storage, as well as the implications of those temporary storage values for several critical policy design questions relating to greenhouse gas accounting and biological offsets. This analysis suggests, for instance, that appropriate physical carbon discount rates for carbon accounting may be even lower than the social discount rates often used in intergenerational analyses. In the context of agricultural offsets, the social cost of carbon estimates are used to establish a defi nition of equivalence between permanent and temporary offsets; equivalence ratios are derived that vary between ~2 and 30, depending on the discount rate used and the length of the temporary offset contract period.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the question: Is there any reason to invest in mitigation projects that will capture carbon today and then release an equivalent amount of carbon in 50 years? This question asks whether there is any value to the temporary storage of carbon. Note that the question excludes many of the common contexts in which concepts of "temporary storage" or "impermanence" are debated.
For instance, the question is not relevant to the "risk of reversal" discussion, which focuses on quantifying how the risk of premature release of carbon (i.e., before the end of a contract period) impacts the value and integrity of an offset, as well as on designing mechanisms to prevent (or compensate for) such releases at the national or project scale. This analysis assumes that storage reversal will occur with 100 percent certainty at the end of the project period but, conversely, that the carbon will remain stored for the project duration of 50 years. As posed, the question explores the fundamental issue of whether there is value to storage that is known to be temporary.
This discussion paper explores the issues and implications associated with temporary carbon storage in an attempt to articulate whether or not temporary carbon storage has a value, what the nature of that value is, and how it can be used to inform policy design in a variety of relevant arenas for greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting and climate policy.
Specifi cally, this paper explores the implications of a positive valuation of temporary storage in three contexts:
lifecycle GHG accounting for biofuels, agricultural offsets accounting, and deferred emissions from reduced deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) mechanisms.
II. THE VALUE OF TEMPORARY CARBON STORAGE: CLARIFYING THE TERMS
While there is no consensus on the matter, several authors have argued in favor of a positive value for temporary storage of carbon. The literature has cited reasons such as:
1. "buying time" for learning, technological advancement and deployment, or capital turnover (Marland et al., 2001 ); 2. slowing the rise of temperature and therefore delaying the impacts of climate change (Dornburg and Marland, 2008) ; 3. altering the path of emissions in other ways-smoothing out the path of emissions and avoiding peaks-that allow us to delay impacts (Dornburg and Marland, 2008) ; and 4. creating potential for temporary storage to become permanent (Chomitz, 2000) .
For the moment, this analysis is concerned only with the original question about whether temporary storage has a value in and of itself, and therefore eliminates the last reason from discussion and focuses instead on the fi rst three.
There is a fundamental distinction between the fi rst reason given above and the next two. The second and third reasons both refer to the impacts arising from changing the time path of damages incurred by emissions. The "timepath" argument reasons that if temporarily withholding a unit of emissions changes the path of emissions in a way that delays impacts, then aggregate damages from emissions will go down: "Temporary sinks slow the rise of temperature during their maintenance, and, thus, shorten the time of climate change impacts. In an analysis that 'treats climate-change impacts in any year as equally important,' the cumulative temperature impact will always be favorable for temporary sinks" (Dornburg and Marland, 2008 ).
According to this argument, the value of temporary storage arises through impacting the cumulative value of damages incurred; if we delay the onset of those damages, the value of damages in aggregate goes down. This type of value to temporary carbon storage would be manifested in a declining social cost of carbon over time. The social cost of carbon (SCC) refers to the cost of the damage done through the emission of a unit of carbon dioxide (Tol, 2008) . That value is also, analogously, the value or benefi t associated with preventing a unit of carbon dioxide) emissions.
2 If the social cost of carbon is declining, it means that a unit of emissions will add less to the aggregate damage done by carbon dioxide emissions if it is postponed. In this context, the value of temporary storage derives from the reduced costs associated with delayed or "smoothed" carbon dioxide stock buildup.
The "buying time" argument for temporary storage value addresses the fl ip side of the carbon challenge. Rather than addressing how the benefi ts of reducing emissions change over time with atmospheric stocks and damages infl icted, the value of "buying time" for compliance arises from how the costs of reducing emissions are expected to change over time. This argument asserts that, given that we know we want to reduce greenhouse gas emissions permanently, it may be less costly in the long run to engage in temporary reductions now, and then make those reductions permanent at lower cost later, when new technology has been developed or can be adopted in conjunction with natural capital turnover cycles. The value of the temporary reductions in those cases derives from the ability to ultimately make permanent reductions more cost-effectively; that value is fundamentally different from the "smoothing" value described above, where temporary reductions themselves carry a value. According to the "buying time" argument, the value of temporary storage derives from the value of delayed investment in permanent storage.
For clarity, we will refer to the values arising from delayed carbon stock damages as the "value of temporary storage,"
with the assumption that such storage is in fact temporary and ends at the end of the storage project period. In contrast, the value arising from increased fl exibility to costeffectively achieve permanent reductions over time will be referred to as the "value of interim storage." In the latter case, the implication is that the path of emissions reduction will remain unbroken, but that the form of that reduction is likely to change from the interim project to a more permanent reduction at some point.
Such a distinction is important because the pathways generating the values are completely different, as are the methods used to estimate them. In the following sections we explore in more detail the complexities of measuring the value of temporary storage, the proxies used to represent them in policy, the policy arenas in which some of these debates are playing out, and the policy implications of the uncertainty associated with those measurements. An in-depth exploration of the value of interim storage is not covered in this working paper. (Tol, 2008 ). An extensive history of economic analysis on the topic has illuminated the complexities of the issue but has failed to arrive at a consensus value due to the signifi cant levels of uncertainty surrounding the derivation of actual estimates.
III. THE VALUE OF TEMPORARY STORAGE: THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON
A signifi cant portion of that complexity arises from the dynamics associated with carbon emissions and impacts.
Carbon's persistence in the atmosphere, for instance, means that evaluating the full impact of a current unit of emissions requires an understanding of the present damages associated with an additional unit of carbon in the atmosphere, as well as how those damages will change over the lifetime of that unit in the atmosphere.
There are two relevant time horizons in the calculation and use of social cost of carbon estimates in evaluating the greenhouse gas impacts of a project or product (Marshall, 2009 ). The fi rst, the "impact horizon," refers to the period of time over which warming impacts occur when a unit of carbon is emitted. The second relevant time horizon is the "project horizon," or the period of time over which a project or regulation results in changes of emissions and emissions timing (Figure 1 ). In the context of greenhouse gas accounting at the project or product level, it is often necessary to aggregate carbon emissions over time in which are denoted t 1 and t 2 . The social costs of carbon assigned to the emissions, which are denoted A and B, respectively, are calculated by estimating and aggregating emissions impacts over the "impact horizon" (denoted T IH ). The purpose of aggregating over that time horizon is to associate a unit of carbon emissions in a given period with a single measure of damage that refl ects the "cost" of that unit of emissions over time, or, conversely, the "benefi t" of preventing that unit of emissions in that time period.
There are several variables that affect the path of expected damage from a unit of emissions. One of these is the rate at which atmospheric carbon decays as carbon is re-absorbed into biotic sinks such as forests and oceans, which defi nes the form and duration of a unit of emissions' residence period in the atmosphere. The way in which this decay is represented varies, with some authors using a fi xed decay rate applied to atmospheric stocks (Richards, 1997) and others using an exponential decay function that refl ects a declining rate of carbon decay over time (Fearnside, 2000a) . In both cases, the decay function refl ects the purely physical dynamic of the persistence of carbon in the atmosphere over the impact horizon and translates a unit of emissions into an atmospheric carbon stock impact over time. Each unit of emissions is therefore associated with a path of expected damages over time that refl ects both the impact of that unit on atmospheric carbon stocks over time and the Estimates of marginal damage discounted and aggregated back over impact horizon to a single figure A associated with emissions in time t1 and B associated with emissions reductions in time t2. Figure   1 ). This process compares the value of carbon benefi t and cost dollars in different time periods, weights them using a discount rate, and then aggregates them to a single number representing total value expressed in present value terms ( Figure 1 ).
The second round of aggregation is a fairly straightforward process of discounting cost and benefi t fi gures over a fi nite time horizon using economic discounting. The discount factor selected should be internally consistent with the discount factor used to calculate the social cost of carbon in the fi rst round of discounting. Some argue that, in the case of a constant discount rate, the rate should therefore be the same in the two discounting periods (Federal Interagency Working Group, 2010 dealing with the uncertainty inherent in those numbers, will therefore be a critical element in the development of effective climate policy.
U.S. Interagency Working Group Social Cost of Carbon Estimates
In 2009, a governmental interagency working group was established and assigned the responsibility of calculating social cost of carbon estimates to be used in benefi t/cost analysis of regulations impacting carbon dioxide emissions. The working group relied on three integrated assessment models (the FUND, DICE, and PAGE models)
to generate estimates of the monetized damages of climate change impacts associated with carbon dioxide emissions in various time periods. Because such values are extremely sensitive to the discount rate chosen to aggregate impacts over the residence period (or "lifetime") of a unit of carbon in the atmosphere, and because there is so much disagreement about selection of an appropriate discount rate, the working group generated social cost of carbon estimates for three different discounting scenarios: a 2.5 percent, 3 percent, and a 5 percent discount rate. 5 To illustrate the uncertainty associated with the SCC estimates, the working group also presented a set of SCC estimates that represents the 95 percentile estimates for the 3 percent discount rate scenario. These numbers represent the upper tail of the distribution of impacts, and they are roughly three times the estimates that represent the average of the potential impact distribution (Table 1) . Applying the respective discount rates to the social costs of carbon estimates assigned to a unit of emissions in each future time period yields the present value of the social cost of carbon estimates shown in Table 2 . Note that when expressed in "present value" terms, the value of the SCC is declining over time in all cases. This decline occurs because the rate of growth of the social damage estimates shown in Table 1 (i.e., the rate of increase of the cost to society of carbon emissions over time) is lower than the discount rate used to discount the values back to the present. If the value of damages is growing more slowly than the value of current investments (as refl ected in the discount rate used), it is theoretically possible to invest the value of "foregone damages" (at a return equal to the discount rate used) and have it grow faster than damages. The result will be an investment that is large enough to compensate for the value of future social damages.
The working group's results can therefore be used to estimate present values for the temporary storage of carbon (foregoing damages early but incurring them later when stored carbon is released). Table 3 According to the path of SCC estimates derived by the interagency working group, there is always a positive value to temporary storage of carbon (Table 3) . These fi gures suggest that there are positive benefi ts to society of storing carbon now, even if it is released later. That value increases with the length of storage and is highly sensitive to the discount rate and structure selected. Also according to these estimates, the value of temporary storage declines as the discount rate increases; the higher the discount rate, the lower the SCC in any time period, because future damages are more heavily discounted. The more heavily the future is discounted, the lower the value that is attached in the present to the damage that future carbon emissions are assumed to cause, and the less value there is to delaying those damages.
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The following sections discuss some of the arenas in which the concept of social cost of carbon plays an important role in policy and regulation design in general, as well as the implications for those issues of using the new regulatory social cost of carbon fi gures as estimates of the temporary value of carbon under different discounting and uncertainty scenarios.
IV. RELEVANT POLICY ARENAS
The importance of the concept of temporary storage, and
how relative values of emissions at different points in time compare, plays out across a number of different policy arenas, including:
• Biofuels greenhouse gas accounting: Accounting for paths of carbon emissions associated with biofuels production in assigning a single greenhouse gas content fi gure for a gallon of biofuel.
• Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation: Assigning a value to deferred deforestation, where deforestation rates are lowered, but permanent protection is not guaranteed.
• Biological offsets (e.g., in agriculture and forestry):
Defi ning the equivalence of temporary and permanent offsets in order to determine how/whether they should be tradable within the same market.
• Accounting for long-lived versus short-lived forest products in land-use change or product-based accounting: Determining whether/how carbon emission values assigned to long-lived forest products such as timber should differ from shorter-term carbon emissions, such as those arising through burning, in determining the carbon impact of a forestry project.
• Allowance banking and borrowing: Determining an appropriate rate of trade across time for emissions credits that can be banked or borrowed.
The following case studies quantitatively explore the implications of a positive valuation of temporary storage in two contexts: lifecycle GHG accounting for biofuels and agricultural offsets accounting. Some thoughts on implica-tions of temporary storage valuation for the debate surrounding deferred emissions from REDD mechanisms are also introduced in Box 4.
V. CASE STUDY: BIOFUELS, LIFE CYCLE ANALYSIS, AND GREENHOUSE GAS ACCOUNTING
In the United States and elsewhere, biofuels have been promoted as an alternative to petroleum-based fuels. The anticipated benefi ts include revitalized rural economies, increased energy independence, and reduced greenhouse gas emissions associated with the transport sector. In recent years, however, experts have raised concerns about the magnitude of greenhouse gas emissions arising from the land-use change associated with the production of biofuel feedstocks. These concerns raise questions about the claims of greenhouse gas benefi ts associated with biofuel production and use (Searchinger et al., 2008) .
The two major regulations supporting biofuels development-California's "Low Carbon Fuel Standard" and the U.S. Renewable Fuels Standard-therefore require quantifi cation of the greenhouse gas content of the biofuel in order to ensure that it satisfi es greenhouse gas requirements attached to the law. In both cases, greenhouse gas "content" is broadly interpreted to mean a life-cycle-based measure of all greenhouse gases emitted throughout the production and transport of the fuel and its major inputs.
The carbon dioxide released when biofuels are combusted as fuel is not included in such accounting because it is "short-cycle" carbon that was absorbed from the atmosphere as the biofuel feedstock grew. However, other GHG emissions arise at several stages in the production of biofuels that must be accounted for, including the GHG emissions associated with clearing or converting land, growing and fertilizing the feedstock, transporting the feedstock, and converting the feedstock into fuel.
Until recently, the potential for signifi cant carbon dioxide emissions associated with land-use conversion for feedstock production was recognized but largely neglected in quantifi cation efforts. Recent research reports, however, have attempted such quantifi cation, arguing that the potential magnitude of these emissions is too signifi cant to ignore (Searchinger et al., 2008) . Such emissions are complicated to quantify, however, in part because carbon emissions from land-use change, and the avoided emissions from substituting biofuels for fossil fuels in transport, are ongoing over time and can be diffi cult to attribute to specifi c policies. Efforts to quantify the net emissions associated with land-use change and attribute those emissions to current biofuel production or biofuels policy, therefore, must utilize an accounting methodology that allows for aggregation of such emissions into a single fi gure that can be compared across fuels and across other policy options for reducing GHG emissions.
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For such aggregation, it is necessary to select two important analytical parameters: (1) a time frame for analysis that sets temporal boundaries within which emissions or emissions reductions are counted, and (2) some sort of weighting scheme that allows the analyst to compare one unit of emissions (or displaced emissions) that occurs today with a similar unit that occurs at variable points in the future. These parameters are familiar in economic analyses. In cost/benefi t analysis they are referred to as the "amortization period" and the "discount rate," and they represent critical policy decisions about the relevant time frame for analysis and how future emissions (or savings)
will be valued relative to those today.
In its proposed rule for calculating the greenhouse gas emissions associated with a gallon of biofuel, as required by the Energy Independence and Security Act's Renewable Fuel Standard, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency proposed two possible methods to handle time in the aggregation of carbon emissions. In the fi rst scenario, carbon costs (i.e., from land use change) and benefi ts (i.e., from displaced petroleum use) are estimated for 30 years beyond initiation of a biofuel production project.
These fi gures are then aggregated using a 0 percent discount rate to determine net carbon impact over the length of the project. The alternative scenario tracked carbon costs and benefi ts for 100 years from project initiation and discounted them back to the present for aggregation using a 2 percent discount rate.
EPA's proposed rule broke from economic discounting tradition, however, by applying the discount rate directly to physical carbon units rather than to the economic impact of those emissions. Because discount rates are generally used in the context of investment decision making to refl ect the "time value of money," they are usually applied to monetary units, such as costs or benefi ts, rather than to physical units such as tons, million metric tons of carbon equivalent (MMTCE), or pounds (lbs) per acre. Although the practice of applying discount rates directly to physical units to estimate the "time value of carbon" in assessing carbon mitigation options is becoming more common (Stavins and Richards, 2005) , a great deal of disagreement exists about the validity of applying discounting principles to carbon units.
The purpose of comparing physical carbon emissions in the future to physical carbon emissions in the present through some sort of discounting procedure is essentially to capture how the value of the damage caused by a unit of emissions in the future will compare to the value of the damage caused by a unit of emissions today (see Box 2). The process of applying a discount rate to carbon tonnage is therefore a "short cut" to information about how the value of damages changes over time that skips the series of important steps described above that translates physical impacts into economic impacts (Marshall, 2009 ).
When transferring the discounting practice over to physical units, it is important to recognize that, despite a failure to include explicit impact and damage curves in the analysis, the time value of carbon refl ected in the discount rate is nevertheless a function of underlying cost and benefi t relationships, which are assumed to drive changing "carbon values" over time. In such studies, the discount rate must therefore capture more than just the "time value of money" Suppose an activity or product is going to result in one ton of additional emissions each year for 10 years and the task is to calculate the carbon impact of that product or activity.
If it is perceived that units of emissions are equivalent over time, then the carbon impact can be estimated at a 0 percent discount rate (i.e. no change over time) and the total impact is calculated to be 10 tons.
Use of a non-zero physical carbon discount rate, however, reflects a perspective that the importance of emissions in different time periods changes, so that one ton of emissions ten or twenty years from now should not be treated as equivalent to one ton of emissions this year when calculating a total impact figure. A physical carbon discount rate is applied to a unit of emissions to indicate how much weight is attached to that unit of emissions in aggregating emissions over time to arrive at a total impact figure. Use of a 2% physical carbon discount rate for the GHG accounting problem described above results in the following carbon impact estimate: The implicit purpose of the discount rate when applied to a physical carbon unit is to refl ect the relative weights of the value of damage done by emissions in each time period.
The social cost of carbon estimates can therefore be used to derive discount rates which, when applied to the physical carbon unit, produce a discounted physical carbon fi gure that is proportional to the discounted social cost fi gure.
Such a fi gure can be used to come up with a discounted carbon content estimate based on "damage-weighted" carbon emissions fi gures for multiple time periods.
As an example, consider the stream of social cost fi gures derived in the case of the 2.5 percent discount rate (Table   5 ). The second column discounts that SCC back to the present year using a 2.5 percent discount fi gure. Note that the appropriate physical discount rate (shown in column fi ve) is signifi cantly lower than the economic discount rate used in the analysis (which in this case is 2.5 percent). Furthermore, the schedule of physical discount rates to be applied to emissions in the different years is non-constant and increasing over time. This dynamic arises because the estimated SCC fi gures increase at a declining rate over time.
To illustrate how such discounting fi gures might be applied in the context of GHG accounting for biofuels production, consider the problem of calculating the GHG impact associated with the production of ethanol from an acre of land. A very stylized schedule of production emissions might appear as shown in Table 6 . These fi gures refl ect large up-front costs associated with potential carbon emissions from land-use change, followed by a stream of benefi ts associated with displaced petroleum use from ethanol produced on the land for 30 years after conversion.
According to EPA's fi nalized rules for the calculation of GHG impacts under the Renewable Fuels Standard, such emissions should be aggregated over 30 years using a discount rate of 0 percent. The calculations shown in Table   5 suggest that, even with a project period of 30 years, a non-zero discount rate is appropriate if the objective of the aggregation is to generate a "damage-weighted" total of emissions costs and benefi ts over time. The results in Table 6 illustrate that the use of this discount schedule discounts the stream of future benefi ts suffi ciently to narrow the gap between project benefi ts and costs (from a net benefi t of 3.5 in the undiscounted case to just 1.1 in the discounted case). As one might expect, use of a physical discount rate could tip the comparison so that costs exceed benefi ts if the physical emissions and savings fi gures are suffi ciently close in the un-discounted case. Table 7 illustrates a case where a project with net benefi ts of 1.5 in the un-discounted case becomes undesirable, with a net benefi t of -0.8, in the discounted case.
In this analysis, the discounted case accounts for the fact that there is a foregone storage benefi t associated with the release of large amounts of carbon at the front end of the project through land-use change. Use of the discount rate therefore narrows the margins of benefi ts for the project relative to the case where the value of temporary storage is not accounted for. Such offset opportunities, termed "biological" or "sequestration" offsets, differ fundamentally from other potential offset opportunities within agriculture, however. Offsets generated from the use of methane digesters, changes in fertilizer use, and other agricultural practices represent emissions reductions that are permanent; future changes in practices will not re-emit the carbon reductions achieved through use of the technology or practice.
VI. CASE STUDY: BIOLOGICAL OFFSETS AND TEMPORARY CARBON STORAGE VALUE
Biological sequestration projects can make no such guarantee. Forests grown this year for sequestration purposes, for instance, could be harvested in 30 years if timber market prices change or could accidentally burn and release stored carbon as a result of natural processes.
Because biological sequestration cannot guarantee permanent storage, it is diffi cult to defi ne how such biological offsets "stack up" against permanent reductions in meeting emissions reductions goals for climate policy. Defi ning some measure of equivalence between permanent reductions and biological offsets, however, is critical to designing offset markets that allow one to be traded for the other.
The "permanence" issue in the biological offsets debate addresses the question of how policy can be designed to ensure that activities that are inherently impermanent can and annually rented credits of some kind (Blanco and Forner, 2000; Fearnside, 2008; Sedjo and Marland, 2003; Bigsby, 2009 ).
There are two different approaches to the design of solutions to permanence issues with respect to biological offsets. One approach considers temporary offsets to be simply an interim storage mechanism that is just one part of a permanent sequestration path. According to this approach, the challenge to solving the permanence problem is ensuring that when and if the biological offset project "reverses" and re-emits its stored carbon, the purchaser of the temporary credit takes measures to ensure re-sequestration through either another temporary credit or a permanent reduction elsewhere. Sedjo and Marland (2003) The relative values derived from the ton-year method, however, are highly sensitive to the equivalence duration chosen; the longer the equivalence duration, the less value is awarded to temporary storage. There is a great deal of debate about whether a 100-year assumption is appropriate or arbitrary, but it has the advantage of being consistent with the construction of the Global Warming Potential indices that are used to determine equivalence among the impacts of different greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere (Herzog et al., 2003) .
Implications of Social Cost of Carbon Estimates for Equivalence Estimates
Like discounting physical carbon in the context of biofuel GHG accounting, the equivalence concept introduced here, though often measured in physical units such as ton-years, can be interpreted as a shortcut for comparing the value of damages done by emissions in different time periods. In the context of temporary credits, a permanent reduction can be said to be equivalent to the number of temporary reductions that provide an equivalent level of damage reduction. Theoretically, if used as a trading ratio between permanent and temporary credits, that ratio should create an equivalence relationship that yields a comparable impact between permanent reduction and the requisite number of temporary credits, and ensures that the respective market prices refl ect the relative impacts of temporary versus permanent storage.
As an example, consider the 5 percent discount rate scenario shown in Table 1 (which illustrates the The ton-year accounting method is one method often proposed as a way to compare the value of temporary storage to a permanent reduction or to other storage projects of different durations. This method relies on an underlying duration equivalence assumption, often 100
years, that essentially asserts that storage of 100 years or longer is considered permanent and therefore equivalent to a permanent reduction (Herzog et al., 2003; Fearnside, 2002a ). Storage of less than 100 years is discounted. Herzog et al. (2003) explain "the 'discount' for non-permanent storage is based on differences in the integrated atmospheric carbon over the 100 years from a pulse of carbon removed from the atmosphere at time t = 0 and re-emitted to the atmosphere at time t = T based on a simulation of a carbon cycle model" (Figure 2 ).
Note that due to degradation in the atmosphere, a permanent reduction is considered equivalent to 46 ton-years, given a 100-year frame of consideration. In contrast, a ton of carbon stored in a forestry project and released in year 50 has a ton-year benefit equal to the difference between emitting the unit now (46 ton-years) and emitting the unit in year 50 (28 ton-years), or 18 ton-years. Such a project would therefore be credited with 18 ton-years of storage, versus a permanent reduction that is credited with 46 ton-years of storage. As one would expect, the equivalence ratios for shorter projects are much higher than they are for longer projects.
In the case of ten-year storage credits, for instance, the benefi t of the storage is only $4.70 -$4.17 = $0.53 per ton of carbon sequestered. One would therefore need to purchase 9.0 (4.7 / 0.53) temporary, ten-year storage credits in order to avoid the same amount of damage as permanent reduction avoids. The equivalence trading ratios calculated for each discounting scenario are shown in 8. These estimates suggest that as the discount rate used decreases, the necessary trading ratio between temporary credits and permanent reductions increases. This is because as the discount rate decreases, damages from future emissions are discounted less. If future emissions have higher relative damages, then the value of temporary storage goes down, as does the value of temporary storage credits relative to permanent reductions (see note 6).
VII. UNCERTAINTY AND THE VALUE OF TEMPORARY CARBON STORAGE
Thus far, average values have been used to illustrate the value of temporary carbon storage derived from the interagency working group social cost of carbon numbers.
It is important to consider, however, that the social cost of carbon estimation effort produces a full range, or distribution, of potential impacts and costs, from which is derived a single average cost estimate. Averages are one method used to "represent" a full distribution of results; they have the advantage of being commonly used and easily understood as one method of representing the "center" of a distribution. Averages are so common, in fact, that representing a distribution of potential estimates through the use of an average (or a median-another measure of the "center" of a distribution) is often taken for granted as being appropriate across policy contexts.
In fact, use of the average to represent a distribution of results is a policy decision that refl ects an underlying attitude toward the uncertainty associated with the distribution of outcomes. Consider that using the time path of average damages for a given discounting scenario to represent future costs means that, even if you accept the range of modeled outcomes as a reasonable range of outcomes, there is a 50 percent probability that social costs of carbon costs, climate policy should be designed to "hedge against the risk that greenhouse gas emissions will lead to catastrophe" (Anda et al., 2009 ). The use of a trading ratio absolves developing countries of the liability to replace temporary credits when they expire by ensuring that multiple temporary storage credits offset an equivalent amount of damage to permanent reductions.
iv Awarding value to fixed-length contracts, while at the same time recognizing them as fixed-length and therefore of variable carbon-mitigation value depending on the length of the storage period, may help find middle ground between source country concerns about national sovereignty over natural resources and environmental concern about the integrity of the credits sold.
Notes
i. Ebeling and Yasue (2008) argue that reducing deforestation rates is as "permanent" as fossil fuel-use reductions, which still leave the fuel in the ground for possible later use. If all fossil fuels are ultimately going to be exploited, then any current reduction measure is actually a deferral of use. They argue that the value of such reductions lies in how they impact the timing of emissions: "In fact, a time delay in emissions through temporary abatement measures results in permanent climate benefits because the cumulative atmospheric concentrations of GHGs will be lower at any future point in time." Note the distinction between permanent sequestration and permanent benefits; the argument is that non-permanent sequestration can still provide permanent benefits. The value of temporary storage of carbon reflects those permanent benefits. ii. Under project-level mechanisms the baseline against which emissions removals are measured over time is the estimated amount of emissions that would have been expected under a "business-as-usual scenario." Put another way, these are the emissions expected in the absence of the project activity (in this case, avoiding deforestation). iii. There are objections to establishing a baseline this way, largely based on the fact that deforestation patterns do not tend to stay constant over a country's history, even in a "business-as-usual" situation. Observed "forest transitions" at the national level suggest that a dynamic baseline should reflect decreasing deforestation rates over time and with development. The myriad difficulties associated with selecting a baseline are not the topic of this paper, however. iv. This structure is in contrast to the temporary credits generated by land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) activities under the E.U. Emission Trading Scheme. Under the LULUCF structure, governments assume liability to replace or renew temporary LULUCF credits once they expire; offset credits used in conjunction with ongoing liability for permanent reduction represent interim carbon storage mechanisms rather than the temporary storage mechanisms described in this paper.
knowledge that narrows uncertainty in the future (Anda et al., 2009 (Table 9 ). The current social cost of carbon estimates come very close to replicating that scenario, though one can see from Table   8 In the context of calculating trading ratios for agricultural offsets, the fact that the 95 th percentile SCC estimates stay proportionately higher early in the time horizon means that the value of temporary credits that expire in those time periods is relatively lower in the case of the 95 th percentile than in the average case. Therefore, for those time periods in which higher than proportional estimates are maintained, more temporary credits will be required in order to reach equivalence with the benefi ts achieved through a perma-nent reduction than are required in the average estimates case ( Figure 5 ).
It is important to reiterate that the results illustrated here derive from the fact that the 95 th percentile estimates stay close to a fi xed multiple of the average estimates. These results highlight that the critical element in an examination of the relative value of the temporary storage of carbon is the ratio of SCC costs at some point in the future to the current costs; even though absolute SCC costs along the 95 th percentile are much higher than those along the average, the value of temporary storage relative to a permanent reduction is similar along the two paths because they are close to fi xed multiples of each other. Future 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The federal interagency task force estimates of social cost of carbon suggest that it is possible to achieve permanent climate benefi ts from carbon storage projects that do not necessarily ensure permanent reductions or sequestration.
While these estimates are, of course, sensitive to the methodologies used to calculate them-as well as to a number of assumptions about projected emissions paths, damage functions over time, economic growth paths, and other factors-it is instructive to understand the implications of non-zero temporary carbon storage values across a number of policy arenas.
A couple of broad generalizations emerge from an examination of the social cost of carbon numbers themselves. Of critical signifi cance in most policy arenas is the fact that temporary storage value is highly sensitive to the length of storage as well as to the weighting structure used to aggregate and compare the monetized costs and benefi ts associated with climate change over time. Though such generalizations are intuitive, illustrating this sensitivity using available numbers highlights the importance of incorporating such considerations into policy design (in the case of sensitivity to project duration) and transparent policy decision making (in the case of discount rate selection) when dealing with issues related to temporary carbon storage.
The question of how the value of temporary storage compares to that of permanent reductions is a fundamental issue across a number of current, and contentious, policy debates. Relevant policy arenas range from carbon markets concerned with fungibility of credits for temporary storage to life-cycle analysis of the GHG content of a product whose emissions benefi ts or costs play out over time. This paper presents approaches to using the new social cost of carbon estimates to address such questions in the context of biological offsets and the life-cycle analysis of the GHG content of biofuels. This paper, and the methodologies it presents, is designed to advance the dialogue in these areas by clarifying the concepts involved and moving discussion beyond theoretical debate to the potential policy applications of actual estimates.
The science of carbon cost estimation, however, continues to evolve. If such estimates are to be useful in policy applications, practical mechanisms for addressing their inherent uncertainty will need to be designed. Such mechanisms, for instance, could include selection of a tainty around estimates, and how it changes over time, is fundamental to the question of how such mechanisms will infl uence policy design parameters. More explicit exploration of that uncertainty, and how it changes with model structure and input parameter uncertainty structure, will be a critical element in future research efforts on temporary carbon storage value and policy design. 
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